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Abstract-The
for
Abstract- The correctness of the position is fundamental for
position-based services. Previously proposed position verification
schemes require an infrastructure, or the existence of a one-hop
verifier. These
direct communication between the prover and the verifier.
feasible in infrastructure-less networks where
schemes are less feasible
communication is achieved via multiple hops, such as mobile
ad hoc networks. In this work we propose PO'V,
p 0 2V, a lightweight,
network layer position verification scheme for distributed position
services in mobile ad hoc networks, under which a position
server can verify whether a user has reported a correct position.
We use adaptive transmitting power and multi-path polling to
improve verification accuraq.
accuracy. We study different attacks against
the verification scheme and propose corresponding mitigation
\I1e use a reputation
reputation system to reduce the false
techniques. We
positives in a network with and without attackers.
attackers. Our analysis
and simulation studies show that while less expensive because
no advanced techniques are required in the physical layer,
PO'V
Po 2 V can achieve a verification accuracy that suffices for many
applications.

1. INTRODUCTION
Location-based services (LBS) [1],
[I]: [2]
[Z] have become an
important part of pervasive computing services. A LBS server
uses the location of a user to determine whether the user should
be served. Location or position information is also used in
facilitate routing. Position-based
mobile ad hoc networks to facilitate
(or geographic)
geographic) routing protocols [3]
[3] make decisions based on
the geographical position of the destination of a packet, and
therefore have better scalability and routing performance (e.g.,
delivery ratio, end-to-end delay) than traditional routing protocols. In sensor networks, the location of a sensor determines
whether the information collected by the sensor is useful, as
the location indicates what area the sensor is monitoring.
The correctness of position is essential for position-related
services. For example,
example. location-based
location-based access control allows
a client to obtain access to a service based on location. A
malicious user may claim to be within an area that gives
him fraudulent access to a service. In the context of sensor
networks, many sensor applications require the knowledge of
the origin of the sensed information. A malicious participant
can pretend to be at critical positions and provide misleading
addition. a false
false position in sensor networks
information. In addition,
displacenlent (a sensor is
facilitates attacks such as sensor displacement
facilitates
temporarily moved out of the network by an attacker with
compron~iseit,
itt but the sink will believe that the
the goal to compromise
sensor is still in the network), wormhole attack (a sensor thinks

i t is its neighbor) and false
false network
a node far away from it
topology (a base station makes wrong routing decisions based
false sensor positions). In ad hoc networks:
on false
networks, as positionbased routing relies on correct positions.
positions, a false position of
failure. Moreover. an
the destination will result in a routing failure.
attacker can make a neighbor to believe that the attacker is
the closest to the destination and be selected on the routing
result. the
path:
path, by manipulating the position infonnation. As a result,
attacker will obtain control of significant traffic in the network.
Finally,
Finally. the correctness of the position information is essential
for secure protocols that use position to prevent certain threats
against network services [4],
[4], [5].
[5].
Position services can be classified in nerwork-cellfric
i1erwo1-k-ceilrric if
the network obtains the position of the device directly,
directly. or
device-ceilrric if the method of obtaining the position relies
device-cellfric
on a device (i.e. a mobile LBS user. an ad hoc node, or a
sensor node). For example,
example: in a network-centric approach. the
leanled based on
011 the access point he
position of a user is leamed
is connected to or the base station he
oObtains service from,
he-obtains
since he must be within their coverage area. More accurate
network-centric position obtaining approaches can be found
[6], [7].
[7]. In comparison, in a device-centric service, the
in [6],
e.g.,
position of a device is obtained by the device itself,
itself: e.g.,
[8] satellites or
according to the navigation signals from GPS [8]
[9]. The
the beaconing signals from pre-deployed landmarkers [9].
position is reported to so-called position servers,
servers, which store
the positions. Other network users can retrieve the position
information from the position server for different network
functions.
functions. Device-centric position service systems have been
[I O]? [11],
[I I]. [12],
[I 21. [13].
[ I 31.
proposed in mobile ad hoc networks in [10],
An attacker can generate false
false position information and
interrupt network-centric position-based services by disrupting
the position calculation function. In the case of device-centric
sin~plyreport a false
position-based services,
services: an attacker can simply
position or attack the navigation signal in GPS or the beaconing signal in sensor networks, ensuring that the positions
correct.
obtained by honest users are not correct.
Position verification is a critical service. Its absence can
result in nlllnerous
numerous problems as discussed above. In the rest of
the paper, we call the device of which the position needs to
be verified a prover, and the parties that verify the position
~ * e r i ' e r sPreviously
.
proposed position verification schemes
verifiers.
[15],
[15], [14],
[14]. [16],
[16], [17]
[I71 require an infrastructure,
infrastructure. because the

co-operation among a number of verifiers is needed to determine a false position report. Thus, they are less feasible
feasible in
infrastructure-less networks, such as inobile
mobile ad hoc networks.
In addition, as these schemes require one-hop connections
between the prover and its verifiers, they cannot be applied
directly in mobile ad hoc networks and sensor networks where
the verifier can be several hops away from the prover.
In this paper we focus on attacks where a user intentionally
sends false
false position reports in a multi-hop wireless network.
We propose p oo22V,
V , a lightweight, network layer polling based
position verification scheme, that verifies the position information in a device-centric position-based service,
service: in a multi-hop
wireless network. Our scheme is less expensive because it does
not use physical layer techniques [7]
[7] [18]
[I81 [19]
[19] [20]
[201 to verify
Po
the position. The trade-off is that P
o 22 V has higher granularity
and it can verify that a prover is within an area 1. The size
of the area is detem1ined
determined by the radio transmitting range for
the polling message. Such a verification result is sufficient for
many scenarios. Examples of such scenarios are: region-based
access services, where a server must verify that a mobile user
is within a region:
region; sensor monitoring, where what is needed is
to estimate the area where the sensor is located, therefore to
estimate the monitoring range; ad hoc geocasting [21],
(211. [22],
[22].
where the region information of a destination is used to for
routing.
We present and evaluate the scheme in the context of a
distributed position service system designed for mobile
inobile ad hoc
networks. We summarize the major contributions of the paper
as follows:

'.

.

• We design P
PoO2 V,
~ Va, network layer position verification
scheme. A testing message,
message, named polling message, is
sent by the verifier toward the prover to verify the tested
position.
• We evaluate the accuracy of the proposed scheme by
both analysis and simulation. We propose as metrics the
probability that a false reporter can be caught and the
perturbation area that a false
false position can be located, to
evaluate the accuracy. We also evaluate the false
f a k e positive,
judged by mistake
where a legitimate position reporter is judged
to be malicious.
• We propose and analyze different enhanced algorithms
that further improve the scheme. We adapt the transmitting power of the polling message to reduce the testing
error. We propose multi-path detection and advanced
physical layer techniques to further improve the accuracy.
• We identify the potential attacks on the scheme and
propose mitigating techniques. We address a so-called
intersection attack and propose the triangle transmission
through a third party to mitigate the attack.
attack. We analyze
the attacks where a malicious party intentionally drops the
trust/reputation system to
polling message and propose a trusttreputation
avoid blacklisting legitimate users.

.
.

.

To the best of our knowledge,
011 multiknowledge, the only work on
I'We
We nOle
P o 2V in
note that
rhar physical layer techniques can be combined with
wirll Po'V
the last hop of the polling message path,
!he
path. to improve verifi cation accuracy.

hop position verification is [23].
1231. A verifier finds a number of
position proxies that are within a one-hop connection with the
prover, through which the prover's position is verified.
Po2\/'
verified. P
o 2V
is more general, the approach in [23]
1231 can be considered as a
special case of our approach.
approach.
The rest of the paper is organized
01-ganized as follows. In Section II
I1
we present the related work. In Section IlL
111; we introduce the
concept of using polling for position verification,
verification, followed by
Po 2 V.
Section IV where we provide
pi-ovide a detailed description of po2\/.
In Sections V, and VI:
VI, we analyze
anaIyze the accuracy for the position
verification and show the major results of simulation
sinlulation study,
VI1, we conclude the work.
respectively. In Section VIL
II.

RELATED

WORK

Position Service Systems
A. Positioti
Sj:sretn.s
An
pOSItIon services is the
A11 example of network-centric
network-centric position
E911 location system in a cellular network [6],
E911
[6]: where the
cellular network determines the position of a cellular user by
measuring the distance between the cellular user and a number
of base stations. Another example is the indoor location system
[7]. A small
snlall unit called BAT is attached to the
presented in [7].
mobile object.
inobile
object. The location system is fine-grained, with a
number of fixed stations allocated in different areas in an
indoor environment.
environment. Each time the fixed stations transmit a
radio message containing a single identifier, causing the correspondent BAT to reply with a short pulse of ultrasound. The
location system calculates the position of the BAT using the
method of multilateration,
multilateration: according to the distance between
the BAT and different fixed stations.
In a device-centric
device-centric position service, the server can be a
centralized entity,
entity, such as the base station in a sensor network
or the cellular network in a cellular-assisted ad hoc network
[31].
[31]. Servers can also
aJso be distributed, such as those in the
typical works including Grid Location Service (GLS) [10],
[lo],
Distributed Location Management (DLM) (DLM) [I
[ I I], and
[ 121, [13].
[1 31.
Virtual Home Region (VHR) based systems [12],
In GLS,
GLS? the area covered by the entire network is divided
into an hierarchy of grids with squares of increasing size.
In each level of the grids,
grids. a node assigns an equal number
of position servers.
servers. These servers have the closest identifier
distance to this node's identifier. compared
coinpared with all the other
ad hoc nodes in the same grid. Once a node needs the position
information of another node. among all the nodes for whom
it has the position information, it selects the node whose
identifier is the closest to the target node and forwards
forwards the
request. As in GLS,
GLS. in DLM, the area covered by the network
is divided into an hierarchy of grids. Unlike in GLS,
DLM,
GLS: in DLM,
for each node, its position servers are decided by whether the
nodes reside in a certain area. The positions of those grids
are the hashed result from the node's identifier, so that any
other node who needs this node's position knows to which
grid it should forward the position request to. The VHR[13], [12],
[12], does not require the
based position service system [13],
knowledge of grid hierarchy. Each node has a virtual home
region (VHR) which is a geographical region around a fixed
center. A number of servers are deployed in the network. A

server located in a node's VHR will store the updated position
of this node and respond to other nodes who request this
position. The relationship between a node identifier and its
function is
VHR center is given by a hash function. This function
join the network,
predefined and known by all the nodes who join
network.
so that other nodes can acquire a node's position by sending
position requests to the corresponding VHR.

Device-Centric Posiriorl
Position
B. Position Obtaining
Obmilli~lgTechniques
Techjliqlres in
111 Device-Ce11r1-ic
Services
A device can obtain its absolute position according to
the distance to some reference points of which the absolute
positions are known. The measure of the distance between a
device and the reference points can be either range-based or
range-free.
Range-based approaches use absolute point-to-point
point-to-point distance or angle information between the device and reference
~nultilateration.Compoints to calculate the locations through multilateration.
mon techniques for distance/angle
distancelangle estimation including Time
of Arrival (TOA) [8],
[8], Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA)
[18][7]
[I 8][7] [19], Angle of Arrival (AOA) [20],
[20]: and Received
Signal Strength (RSS) [18].
[I 81. The well known GPS [8]
[8] system
is a range-based system,
system. where TOA is used for a GPS user to
calculate its distance to a number of satellites,
satellites, and therefore
to obtain its own position. The range-based approaches result
in accurate positions,
radio,
positions. yet the cost on hardware for radio.
sound, or video signals is high. In addition, such approaches
require strict time synchronization.
synchronization. These make the approach
not suitable for the network built up by low-cost devices,
devices, such
as sensor networks; or for dynamic networks, such as mobile
ad hoc networks.
On the other hand, in range-free approaches, the position of
an object is estimated by the connectivity between the object
and the reference points. The exact distance or angle is not
111 [24],
[24], an approximate point in triangle (APlT)
(APIT)
required. In
test algorithm is proposed. APlT
APIT resolves the localization
problem by isolating the environment into triangular regions
between anchor nodes. A node uses the point-in-triangle test to
determine its relative location with triangles formed by anchors
and thus narrows down the area in which it probably resides.
APlT defines the center of gravity of the intersection of all
APIT
triangles that a node resides in as the estimated node location.
Other simple range-free algorithms can be found in [9]
[25]:
[9] [25],
under which location is calculated
calct~lated by finding the centroid
of its proximate anchor nodes. The range-free approaches
have less accurate results, yet the errors can be masked by
fault-tolerance of the network, redundancy computation, and
aggregation.
Range-free approaches have been extended so that an object
can estimate its position even if it is multiple-hops away
from reference nodes. Typical approaches [26],
[26], [27], [28]
[28]
are proposed for sensor networks. In all these approaches, a
I : sensor
position estimation is processed in three steps. In step I,
nodes detect the local connectivity,
connectivity, i.e., find the other nodes
that are within one hop from themselves, and then estimate the
distance from themselves to the reference points, i.e., anchor

node(s). based on the hop counts. In [26],
node(s).
[26], the distance is
obtained by accumulating the range for each hop. To address
llop range depends on
the problem that in a network the hop
topology, in [27]
[27] the range for a hop is obtained
network topology.
tinding out the average geographic distance for a hop
by finding
in the multi-hop connections between anchor nodes. As the
average hop range approach does not address the inaccuracy
problem in highly irregular network topologies, in [28],
[28]. a socalled Euclidian method is proposed, through which the local
geometry of the nodes around an anchor can be deducted.
deducted.
2, the
Based on the information obtained from step J,
I . in step 2:
position of a node can be calculated through multilateration.
However. as such a result may not be as accurate as that in the
single-hop approach due to the error for the distance between
the object and the anchor nodes, in multi-hop approaches, a
refinement is needed in step 3. Such a procedure is iterative,
iterative,
until the positions are converged to a relatively stable value. A
similar multi-hop position estimation approach that is designed
for ad hoc networks is presented in [32],
[32]. where the relative
positions are estimated.
Unlike the multi-hop range-free approaches which rely on
the hop count of the shortest path, making them highly vulnerable to ditlerent
[29], [30], our scheme relies
different attacks on routing [29],
only on the poJling
polling message delivery and has no requirement
for what path should be used. Therefore,
Therefore, diverse routes can
be used to improve both the robustness against attacks and the
verification accuracy.
C.
Position Systems
C. Secure Posiriorl
Sysre~ns

Attacks can be conducted on beaconing signals sent from
the reference points to either interfere with the signal or
spoof the signal,
signal: so that an object can not derive its position
correctly. Such an attack on the GPS navigation signal has
[33]. Software changes in GPS receivers
been presented in [33).
can mitigate some simple spoofing attacks [34].
[34]. For more
sophisticated attacks, such as the so-called selective delay
attack. an asymmetric security mechanism [33]
[33] can be used.
Authentication for the beaconing signal in sensor networks
~uthentication
can be found in [35).
[35]. In [35], a Secure Range-independent
Localization (SeRLoc)
(SeRLoc) scheme based on a two tier network
architecture that achieves decentralized passive localization, is
proposed. A symmetric key approach is used to authenticate
the source of the beaconing signal. In addition, each reference
point is equipped with directional antennas, covering different
sector areas with different transmissions. A sensor detects
the beacon signals from different reference points, computes
the overlapping region of these beacon signals' coverage,
and determines its location as the center of gravity of the
overlapping region. The use of directional antenna improves
the system robustness. A similar approach can be found in
[36].
[361.
Another approach to defend against the attack on the
siznal is to use redundant beaconing information.
beaconing signal
[37]: where the redundancy at
A typical work is present in [37],
tolerate,
ditlerent
different levels in a wireless network is explored to tolerate:
but not eliminate. the attacks. A robust statistical method is

proposed to
to make
make localization based on minimum mean square
estimation
(MMSE)
estimation (MMSE) less affected by different attacks.
attacks.
The
[38] and
The malicious
malicious beaconing detection is studied in [38]
[39].
1391. In
In [38],
1381: a method is
is proposed to filter the malicious
beacon signals
signals on the basis of consistency among multiple
signals.
signals. In addition, a scheme has been designed to tolerate
the
the malicious
~naliciousbeacon signal
signal by adopting
adopting an iteratively refined
voting
[39], a detecting node is used to discover
voting scheme.
scheme. In [39],
the
the malicious beacon nodes. In particular,
particular. a round transmission
function
is
used
to
filter
time PDF
PDF function is
filter out the malicious beacons.
Other
[40]: the knowlOther than protecting beaconing signals, in [40],
edge
edge of sensor deployment is used for a sensor to verify
the
the position derived
derived by itself. The main idea is that if a
sensor
sensor is
is located at a position, it should have an expected
neighborhood with sensors
sensors from different groups that have
predictable geographic
geographic distributions.
In
[I51 Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is proposed,
proposed. a techIn [15]
nique
nique that enables secure computation and verification of the
positions of wireless nodes in the presence of attackers. A
number of reference points independently perform distance
bounding to
to the verified wireless device.
device. A centralized authority
thority estimates the device's position based on the known
positions of the verifiers and the distance bounds. VM prevents
dishonest
dishonest nodes from
from lying about their positions because of the
property of distance bounding, that neither an attacker nor a
prover can reduce
reduce the measured distance of the prover to the
4], an echo mechanism is used
verifier,
verifier, but only enlarge
enlarge it.
it. In [J
1141:
to
to verify whether a wireless device is within a region. This is
a rough verification that only determines
determines whether a prover is
within an
6], [17]
an area.
area. [l
[l6],
[I71 show different ways of verifying the
location of the
the satellite
satellite user,
user. The network uses satellite ranges
to
IocPted.
to estimate where its users are located.
III. POSITION VERIFICATION BY POLLING

This section presents how the polling method can be applied
This
to verify the position of a prover in a distributed position
to
service system in mobile ad hoc networks. We also list the
service
attacks that may undermine the polling-based verification
and list the cases of false
false positives.
scheme and
A. Network and
atid Security Assumptions
Assutnptiotis
We assume
assume that ad hoc nodes are uniformly distributed in a
We
specific area.
area. A number of mobile servers are also distributed
specific
in the
the network.
network. Each node has a virtual home region (VHR),
(VHR),
in
which can be a circular area and the center of the area uniquely
identifier. Servers that are located within
matches the node's identifier.
a node's VHR provide position services regarding to that
node, such as
as position information storage, position update,
update.
node,
Distcrtice-bcrsed position update is
and position retrieving.
retrieving. Distance-based
and
processed, under which an ad hoc node updates its positions
processed,
to the
the servers
servers in its VHR only when the distance between
to
its current position and the position in its previous report is
its
value. Other nodes obtain this node's
more than a threshold value.
position by contacting the servers. A server can be located in
serve a number of nodes. Neighboring
a number of VHRs and serve
nodes exchange their position information. Therefore, a node
nodes

of its one-hop neighbors. The Greedy
Greedy
knows the position
positIon of
Positioning Routing protocol (GPSR) [42], is used for position
message delivery.
management messaze
We assume that there is an offline certificate authority that
can assign public keys to the servers and ad hoc nodes. Servers
communication
are trusted and cannot be compromised. The communication
between a server and its served ad hoc node as well as the
communication between the servers is protected against eavesdropping, impersonation, modification, replay
replay and injection
injection
[43]. In addition:
addition, a position reporter
reporter cannot
attacks, as in [43].
malicious nodes are
repudiate its reports.
reports. We assume that n~alicious
colluding and have advanced communication
communication channels that
colludin_g
allow them to share information.

B. Basic Polling-based Position Verification Scheme
whether a position
position
A basic approach for the servers to verify whether
toward
reported by a node is correct, is to send a message toward
the reported position. Upon receiving a position update, the
acknowledgment. The
server replies to the sender with an acknowledgnient.
positionacknowledgment will be routed to the sender via positionbased routing using the reported position. A random number,
nOl/nce, is also included in the acknowledgment.
acknowledgment.
referred as a t~orrlzce,
The server accepts the position in the previous position update
if the nounce is included in the following position update.
Since the acknowledgment is sent immediately after the server
receives the position update, it is unlikely that the tested node
can not receive it due to a broken route between the server
obtain
and itself. The only reason that the tested node cannot obtain
the nounce is that it reported a false position, and based on
acknowledgment cannot be delivered
delivered to it.
this position, the acknowledgnient
The server who first receives the updated message generates
position to
the nounce and distributes it with the updated position
node's VHR, using the secure
other servers in the tested node's
communication channel shared by all servers. In this case, ifif
another server receives the following position
position update
update from the
tested node, this server can also verify the previously
previously reported
position. The verification
verification result is then distributed
distributed within the
VHR along with the updated position.
When a server sends the acknowledgment toward the updated position, it must include the destination position
position in
the plain text, which is necessary for position-based
position-based routing.
Therefore, the node's
number
node's position is always disclosed to a number
of nodes that are close to the route for the acluiowledgment
acknowledgment
delivery. This may not result in a direct position information
exposure for the tested node. As the tested
tested node can determine
determine
whether the testing message is destined for itself
itself according to
whether the position carried in the message is the position in
its previous update, its identity does not need to be included
included in
the polling message. However, sending an acknowledgment for
every position update may lead to a match between
between the tested
position and a node ID according to the moving trajectory
trajectory
of the tested node. In addition, sending a position
position acknowledgment upon every position update generates a significant
significant
overhead, unnecessary when most nodes are honest and report
correct positions.

To address the problem. instead of sending an acknowledgment upon every
message, the server can
evely position update message:
send it
i t after a number of position updates. A testing nounce
is included in the acknowledgment.
acknowledgment. We refer to this scheme
as a polling scheme and to the acknowledgment as a polling
message. The node who has been polled has to include the
testing nounce in its next position update.
The polling scheme may work jointly with the existing position verification schemes that use physical layer techniques.
A server may use these technique to verify the positions of the
nodes that are within one hop of it,
it. possibly by cooperating
with other servers.
servers. If
If the nodes are more than one hop away,
the server uses polling for position verification. Such a position
I.
verification scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1.
-------.-----.-~
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Example
position repoJ1.
Exanlple of false positio~~
report

server located in a VHR sends a polling message toward B,
B,
the malicious node can intercept the message and sllccessfully
successfully
send a false position without being caught,
caught. An extreme case
of an intersection attack occurs when the malicious
lnaIicious node stays
within its VHR. If
If the size of VHR is not large,
large: the malicious
node can report a false position anywhere and intercept most
of the verification messages sent from the servers. The intersection attack can severely interrupt the functionality of the
position service system because a node can claim a position
that is far away from its real position. If there are colluded
nodes, a malicious node can mislead the position system by
staying close to the servers
ser\lers of its partners and intercepting all
the polling for them.

Vain cation Scheme.
A Polling-based Position Vzrifi
Scheme.

C Vulnerabilities and Arracks

When using the above basic polling scheme to verify a
node's position, a n~alicious
malicious node is able to take advantage
node's
of the verification scheme and report a false
false position without
being caugHt.
caught. We classify this type of attack as deceiving
position report
posirio17
reporr artack.
orrock. On the other hand, malicious nodes
can attack the polling messages.
messages. An honest position reporter
therefore may not be able to receive the polling message and
judged as malicious. We refer to this type of
be mistakenly judged
attack as a blacklisting
blacklisri~lgarrack.
orrock.
J)
I ) Deceiving Position Report:
If a malicious node knows when the server will send a
(e.g.: when server uses periodic polling), it
polling message (e.g.,
can report the right positions at the time the server polls,
and report false positions otherwise.
otherwise. Figure 2 shows a simple
example.
example. A server polls a tested node once every 3 position
updates. A malicious node, who never moves, may claim its
trajectory as shown in the figure. After the node reports its
L22 and LL33 in
real position L It,, it can claim it is at positions L
its next two reports. These locations are d
d,T away, where d
d,T
is the distance threshold value based on which a node has to
update its positions. After that it reports its real position again,
L1.
false
which is L
j • In this case, it can report a large number of false
positions without being caught.
Another attack, which we refer to as intersection
arrack,
i~irersecrio~i
arrack,
malicious node can report a false
takes place when nialicious
false position
that is on the extended line from its VHR to itself yet still
3: the malicious
receive the polling message. As shown in Fig. 3,
B. When a
node at position A claims that it is at position B.

°A
8B

Fig.
Fig. 3.

o

Example of interception attack.
at~ack

In both of the above attacks, a false position can be relatively
far away from the real position. However, a malicious node
can also take advantage of the in-accuracy of the polling
verification method and claim false positions that are not very
far away from its real position.

2) Blacklisting Honest Nodes:
In a polling-based verification scheme, the only trusted
parties are the position servers and the routing for the polling
messages relies on un-trusted intermediate forwarding nodes.
Therefore, the scheme is prone to attacks against the multihop ad hoc connections between the verifiers and provers.
Malicious nodes can interrupt the communication between a
verifier and a prover so that once a polling message was sent
out, the prover calmot
cannot receive it even if it has reported correct
positions. As a result, the verifier will mistakenly judge an
malicious.
honest node to be n~alicious.
Traditional attacks in ad hoc routing, such as jamming,
packet dropping,
dropping, packet modification, fabrication or replay,
and denial of service (DoS),
(DoS), can be conducted to attack the
polling message. In addition, as position-based routing is used
for polling message delivery,
delivery, the scheme can be attacked by
modifying the routing information,
inforn~ation,which is the position of the
tested node. A node may also send out false positions during
neighboring position exchanges. A malicious node can claim a
position that is the closest to the destination so that a previous

hop may select it as the next hop. Once the polling message is
sent to it based on the false position information, the malicious
node can conduct further attacks such as packet dropping and
manipulation. Attackers can also jam the area around a tested
node or VHR, to cause DoS.

be able to receive the message and return the nounce to the
server.
In this section we provided a detailed description of P
02V
Po2V
that applies techniques to reduce false positives and mitigate
the attacks previously described.

Positires
D. False Positives

DefendiJig Agrritlst
Against Deceivitlg
Deceiving Positiotl
Position Reports
A. Defetldit~g

A false positive in a polling verification occurs when an
honest user who has sent a correct updated position cannot
reply to the polling message. not due to attacks, but due to
failures of the poling mechanisms itself. False positives make
the server incorrectly conclude that the tested node provided
a false
false position information,
information, and diagnose it as a malicious
node.
For example,
example. a false positive occurs if an honest user does
not receive the polling message, because the route between
the server and the tested node does not exist. This is possible
especially when the polling message does not follow the
reverse route of a position update. A tested node may not
polJing message also due to its own
be able to receive the polling
mobility. This may happen if the network is heavily loaded,
and the delay for the polling message delivery is large. If
If the
tested node is highly mobile,
mobile. when the polling message arrives,
the node may have already moved far away from its reported
position and therefore cannot receive the polling message.
Another cause for false
false positives is due to the fact that radio
propagation is hard to predict, and the estimated transmitting
power based on positions may not be accurate enough. When
using adaptive transmitting power for polling message transmission (as in lV-A.3.a),
n~ission
IV-A.3.a): the transmitting power calculated
based on the ideal channel propagation model may not generate the desired transmission
transn~issionrange. A legitimate user who is
located at its previously reported position thus may not receive
the polling message.
Finally, although it
i t has received the polling message successfully, a tested node fails sending the next position update
because the route between itself and the server(s) at that time
does not exist anymore.

1)
I ) Random Polling:
A tested node has to be polled randomly because a periodic
polling gives a malicious node the opportunity to lie about
its position without being caught. When the tested node is
malicious node to predict
polled randomly, it is difficult for the ~nalicious
when its position will be verified. Therefore, there is a high
probability that a false report is discovered.
2) Triangle Verifi cation:
A solution to defend against the interception attack is to
mask the polling message such that the attacker does not know
that the position it reported is tested. For example, the tested
position carried in the polling message is not the exact position
that is carried in its last position update,
update. but a position close
by. However, the attacker can still receive the message
rnessage if it
checks all the messages sent to the positions close to the false
position it reported.
Another approach to defend against the interception attack
is that when a tested node replies to the polling message,
it includes the position of its previous hop from whom it
receives the polling message. The previous hop signs its
position and the neighborship between itself and the tested
node. Thus, the tested node can not lie about its own position.
This approach works against single attackers. When there
are colluded malicious nodes, two attackers can claim false
positions and neighborship to fool the server.
The attack from colluded attackers can be mitigated if the
polling message is sent on a hop-by-hop path and the reply to
the polling message includes the authenticated routing vector
from the server to the tested node. As in the mechanism used
for securing the BGP routing protocol [41],
[4 I], each node en route
signs its existence and verifies the neighborhood relationship
with the next hop. The router vector and the positions of the
nodes en route are piggyback to the polling message. The
tested node sends the information back to the servers.
servers. We
note that this method, although will protect against colluding
attackers, requires tremendous public key process for route
vector authentication.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism to mitigate the
interception attack that does not pay the cost of the above
method, by randomly selecting another node to perform the
polling. The chosen node receives the position that must be
tested via a secure communication between the node and the
position servers. As shown in Fig. 3, a polling message for
B is sent to a node at C
C first.
first. The node at C
C
testing a node at B
then forwards the message toward B.
B. The malicious node at
A cannot intercept the message. A server normally resides in
the overlapped area of a number of VHRs and serves several
nodes. It is able to select the third party who is not close to
the connection between the tested node and the VHR. The

IV. P o 21/:
POSITION
VERIFICATION
2 V : POLLING-BASED
POLLING-BASED
POSITIONVERIFICATION
SCHEME
SCHEME
2

We propose P
Po
o 2V,
V : a polling-based position verification
scheme, under which a server (verifier)
(verifier) verifies the position
reported by a tested node (prover) by sending a polling test
message toward the reported position. A polling message
inessage
carries the tested position in the plain text, and the nounce
encrypted by the key shared between the server and the tested
node. GPSR is used for polling message delivery. For the
polling message delivery, each of the forwarders
forwarders selects the
neighbor that is the closest to the tested position as its next
hop. Once the polling message reaches a node that is close
enough to the tested position, i.e.,
i.e.> the distance between this
node and the tested point is no more than the ad hoc radio
transmission range, this node becomes the last hop for the
polling message delivery. The last hop broadcasts the polling
message. If
If the prover has reported a correct position, it should

message is encrypted by the key shared between the third
party and the servers. In this case,
case; even though the tested
durins the message
node can intercept the polling message during
delivery from the server to the third party, it cannot obtain
the random number used for authentication and carried in the
tested message. For example, a malicious node may intercept
all the polling messages if it is located very close to the server.
server.
However, because it does not know the key shared between
the server and the third party, it cannot decrypt the message
and obtain the nounce.
3)
3) Improving Verifi cation Accuracy:
The proposed polling mechanism is able to catch a false
false
position reporter if the position it reports is far away from
its real position.
position. However. a node can report a position with
a relatively small
snlall error, such that when a polling message is
sent to this reported position, the node can still receive it. As
shown in [44],
[4411a packet delivered to a position can be received
by a node even half of the ad hoc radio transmission range
away from that position.
We propose several techniques that improve the accuracy
of the position verification scheme. As a result, a server
will catch a false position reporter even though the position
error is not large. The proposed techniques are using smaller
transmitting power for the polling message,
message. multi-path verification, crossing-layer verification, node trajectory,
trajectory, as well as
geographic profiles.
a)
Adjusting Transmitting
Power: To catch a node that
a ) Adjrrstir?g
Transmitri~~g
Power:
intentionally reports in-accurate position, a polling message
is transmitted at a lower transmitting power. The lower the
transmitting power is,
is: the more precise the position verification
is. The transmitting power is detennined
determined by the server,
server, and a
power indication is carried in the polling message,
message: according
to which nodes who forward the message will use the same
paper, we refer to this scheme as fixedpower. In this paper:
F-Po
transmission-power P o2V
2 v scheme, or F
- P o22Vv scheme.
transmission-power
The trade-off
trade-off of using a smaller transmission range is
that lowering the transmitting power may lead to a higher
number of hops during the polling message delivery, which
subsequently results in a larger communication
conlmunication load. This
load can be decreased if the polling message is sent to an
intemlediate node using the normal transmitting power, and
in the rest of the route the lower power is used. However,
if the distance between the intennediate
intermediate node and the tested
node is large, many extra hops will be involved.
involved.
To address the above problem, we propose another scheme,
Po 2 V scheme, or Anamely adaptive-transmission-range
adaptive-transmission-range Po2V
2
Po
nomlal
P
o 2V.
V . The polling message is delivered using the nomial
transmitting power level. An intermediate forwarder that receives the polling message checks whether the tested position
is within its transmission range according to the tested position
and its own position, i.e.,
i.e.: whether it is the last hop. If
If
not. it forwards
not,
forwards the message further.
further. Otherwise it adjusts its
transmission range barely
transmitting power and makes its transn~ission
cover the tested position. This last hop of the tested node
then sends the polling message using the adjusted power.
As the distance between the tested position and the last hop

is normally smaller than the maximum ad hoc transmitting
range, the position verification result is more accurate than
the scheme using maximum power.
b) Multi-Path Par-allel
Parallel Pollirlg:
Polling: To improve the position
accuracy,
accuracy. more than one polling messages is sent to test a
single position. The server selects the intennediate
intermediate nodes at
different positions:
positions, therefore the tested message is sent toward
the tested position in different directions. Each testing message
(polling message) carries a unique r7o~rnce.
nounce. The position is
verified only when the tested node shows that it has received
all the nounces. The verification accuracy is improved at
the price of communication overhead,
overhead: because more polling
messages have to be sent.
sent.
c)
Enhancing Po2V
Po 2 V with Advar7cecl
Advanced Techniques:
c) Erlhancing
Techrliques: A
cross-layer design considering both network layer and physical
layer mechanisms can provide powerful solutions for position
security. For example, a position server may first authorize
a mobile user that has a one-hop connection with the tested
entity to process the verification.
verification. The mobile user uses the
VM [15] to
physical layer verification mechanism such as YM
achieve better verification accuracy.
Applying smart antenna in the multi-path verification
scheme is another approach to further improve the verification
accuracy. A server selects two intermediated nodes such that
two polling messages are sent toward the tested position in
different directions,
directions; as shown in fig.
fig. 4. The verification accuform. The approach
racy depends on the width of the beam fonn.
will have an increased cost, because the cost on the physical
layer increases.
Last hop I1

Last hop 2

receive both the testing
Fig. 4.
4. The area where the
Ihe tested node can I-ecsivs
tesling messages.

It is possible that a malicious node sends a false
false position
right after it has been polled. Since the probability that this
node will be polled again is low,
low, the false report may not
be discovered. However, the false position can not be too far
away from the real position, because the distance between
this position and the position in the previous update, which is
correct, should can not be greater than a threshold value used
in distance-based position update. The time between the two
updates cannot be too short, otherwise the tested node has an
unreasonable moving speed.
speed. A joint use of node trajectory and
geographic profiles can help to detect the false positions. For
node's previous position is on one site of a
example, if the node's
wide river,
river. it is less likely it is on the other side of the river
at its next position update if there is no bridge nearby.
nearby.

Mitigating Bl~cklisti~zg
Blacklisting Attacks
B. Mitigati~lg
In this subsection we propose mechanisms
niechanisins that mitigate the
blacklisting attack.
attack. In particular, we focus on the attacks where
malicious nodes intentionally drop or manipulate
nianipulate the polling
messages. Our solution does not focus on addressing attacks
niessages.
caused by jamming.
A simple solution to reduce the probability of blacklisting
an honest user by interrupting the polling message delivery,
is using multi-path delivery. A polling message
inessage is delivered
through paths consisting of different intemlediate
intern~ediateforwarders.
When the number of attackers in the network is small, it
is less possible that there is an attacker in all of the paths
so that all the polling messages are dropped. The server
determines whether a node is honest based on statistics, i.e.,
the probabilities that a honest node responses to the polling
when the network has different number of attackers.
A more sophisticated solution is building a reputation
system for the users of the position service. The trust and
reputation system in ad hoc networks has been studied in [45],
[45],
[46],
[46], where the reputation of an ad hoc node is built upon both
the first-hand observation and the second-hand observation.
For example,
example: for the reputation value of a node A at another
B: the first-hand
first-hand observation is the behavior of A that
node B,
is detected directly by B,
B, and the second-hand infom1ation
information
is information obtained from any other nodes that have a
reputation record for A. Such a system is complex because
there is no trusted party. However,
However. in our investigated scenario,
all the position servers are trusted. This makes the reputation
management less complex.
A server sets an initial value for the reputation of a user. The
value will decrease if the user fails
fails to reply a polling message.
message.
If
If a tested node replies to the polling message successfully,
its reputation will increase. Once the reputation for a user
drops below a threshold value, the server gives it a warning
or prevent it from using the position services.
We denote ,(
y ( n)
n ) as the accumulated reputation for a node
whose position has been tested n times. After the (n
( 1 1 + 1 )th
)fh
verification, denote the updated reputation value as y,(n+
( n + 1),
1),if
nee successfully,
novnce
the tested node replies the server with the nov

yet it forwards
forwards the polling message destined for a malicious
node. In this case the probability of a routing failure is different
between legitimate users and attackers. As an attacker has
a lower probability of routing failure,
failure, the reputation system
parameter designed for legitimate users may help a malicious
user get a high reputation and send false positions while
sin~ulation
keeping its reputation value high. However, our simulation
results show that such an attack can bring serious damage
danlage
only when the number of attackers in the network is laree.
large. In
addition, in p
0 2V, it is difficult for a malicious forwarder to
Po2V,
tell whether the tested node is an honest node or its colluding
partner especially when the polling message is sent to the third
party first,
first, because only the tested position is carried in the
plain text.
C.
Reducing False Positives
C. Reducirig

A false
false positive may occur if at the time the server sends
a polling message toward the tested node, there is not route
between them. To mediate this problem,
problem. when the server does
not receive the testing nounce from the tested node, it polls
a few more times using different paths. The server makes
a decision only when the tested node fails
fails to reply to a
number of polling messages. A complementary technique is
to have the forwarder that detects a routing failure send back
the information to the server,
server. However, this generates more
Po 2 V is used, it
network control overhead. When multi-path Po2V
is likely that the tested node does not receive all the messages.
To reduce the possibility that iti t is blacklisted, the tested node
sends back the partial testing information it
i t receives.
Considering that a false positive is caused by node mobility,
nlobility,
the problem can be solved by assigning the testing message
and other position-related control messages (e.g.,
(e.g.: a position
update message) with higher priority to access the wireless
channel. When CSMAICA is used for channel access, a
higher channel access priority is achieved by using smallersize contention windows or even shorter Differentiated Inter
Frame Space (DIFS). Even if the network is highly loaded with
data traffic,
traffic: the testing message can still be delivered to the
vicinity of the tested position in a short time after it updates
(1) the position.
l'(n + 1) = ,(n) + o.
To reduce the false positives caused by complicated radio
Otherwise,
propagation, a more sophisticated channel propagation model,
(2)
,(n
~ (+ n1)
1 ) == l'(n)
y ( n ) -- /3.
fl
(2) such as the Walfisch-Ikegami model [47]
[47] developed for radio
in
a
metropolitan
area,
can
be used. Fading and
propagation
The relationship between acy and //3
3 depends on the probability of a routing failure.
failure. For example,
exaniple, if the estimated shadowing models should also be considered. In addition,
]nay also
probability for a routing failure in the network is p, to keep geographic profiles such as the location of buildings may
the reputation value of a legitimate user approximately as a be used.
constant, //3
In case the false positive is caused due to the routing
3=
= -a. a.
P
The reputation value can also be Llsed
used to decide how failure for the polling reply, a mitigating mechanism is that
frequent a server should test a node. If a node has a low once a tested node receives a polling message.
message, it includes the
reputation, the server will test this node more frequently and nounce in a few of its following position updates. Another
vice versa.
solution is that once a tested node receives a testing nounce.
nounce,
A malicious node can take advantage of the reputation it updates its position immediately. As the time between the
system with the help of colluding nodes. Suppose a malicious
~nalicious two transmissions is short,
short. it is less unlikely that the route
node always drops the polling message for the legitimate users, between the tested node and its VHR breaks.

+

+

l;P
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ANALYSIS: VERIFICATION ACCURACY

In this section we analyze the accuracy of the proposed
position verification scheme using two metrics. One metric
is the probability that a lying node can be caught when the
false
false position it reports is a certain distance away from its
real position. The other metric is known as the perrurbarior~
perturbation
atea. Perturbation area has been previously used to evaluate
area.
the location privacy in [48],[49].
Poo 22V,
[48J1[49].In P
V , if a lying node
stays in the perturbation area,
area: it can still receive the testing
message sent toward the false position. The larger this area
is, the less accurate the testing algorithm can be. We use PDF
function for the perturbation area to illustrate the verification
accuracy.
~
( r l .T2,
7-2: d)
d) as the curve when a
In our analysis, we denote (T1'
r2 is cut by a circle with a radius of T1,
rl,
circle with a radius of T2
d. We
while the distance between the centers of the circles is d.
S O c pT],
( r lT2.
7-2.
: d)
d ) as the overlapped area of two circular
denote Solp(
areas with radiuses of T]
rl and T2.
7-2.
A. Single-Path Verification

In this subsection we analyze the verification accuracy by
calculating the probability that a false position reporter can be
caueht.
caught.
I) Verifi
Verification
Transmitting Power:
Power: Figure 5
J)
cation with Fixed Transmitting
(a) shows the case when fixed transmission range is used for
(a)
F-Po
i.e.. in F
- P o22V,
V , and a malicious
lnalicious
polling message delivery,
delivery, i.e.,
node reporting a false position is e away from its real position.
We analyze the case when nodes are uniformly distributed
and node density is high. The delivery path for a polling
message from a server or a third party to the tested position
messaee
is app;oximately
approximately a straight line. Since the last hop for the
polling message delivery will broadcast the polling message,
the malicious node can receive the polling message if the
distance between its real position and the reported position
is no more than the radio transmission range for the polling
message. which is denoted as T.
r . In addition, if the malicious
messaee.
node is positioned no more than rr away from the path for
the polling message, it can also receive the message, even
if e > r.
r . The area where a malicious position reporter can
receive the message is the shaded area in Fig. 5 (a). When
false
the real position is e away from the reported one, the false
position reporter can receive the polling message only when
it is located at the bold arch in the figure.
figure.
Let zx be the distance between the last hop and the tested
position. The probability that an attacker can be caught for
false position because it cannot receive the position
reporting a false
( z : e),
e l , is:
verification message, denoted as pp(x,

p(z,e ) =

{

(r.e.z)
2%~.

arcs~n(r/e)

<

2
e JW.
(3)
e::=;vx
+r 2 ,
(3)
otheTwise.
otherwise.

Given an error of e,
e: the average probability that the maliinalicious reporter can be caught, denoted as Pr
Pr-,,:,,
-o1'g, is:
Pj-m;g =

1

p(x, e)1,,(x)dx.

(4)

fI,(x)
! c ( x ) is the probability density function for zx.. In this case
can be uniformly
i~niformlydistributed between 0 and r.
r . Although we
(4): Pr-,,,,
cannot obtain an explicit function for Eqn. (4),
P r - nt.g can be
calculated numerically.
.x
L-

e: The position
posi tion error
r: Testing Transmission
TI-ansmission range

e
Position Verificat

0

tested posi .on

(a) Fixed transmission range

e : The position error
e:
r: Ad hoc Transmission
Transmission r<lnge
range
r:
f'pp :: Testing
Testin: r<lnge
range

(b) Adaptive transmission range
Fig. 5.

Position verifi
verifi cation
calion accuracy.
accuracy

Verification
Transmitting Power:
cation with Adaptive Transmitting
2) Verifi
Figure 5 (b) illustrates the case when adaptive transmission
range is used to deliver the testing message,
message. ,. i.e., in APoo 22V,
P
V . the scenarios that the malicious node can or cannot
receive the testing message if its real position is e away from
the reported position. The bold arch represents the positions
where the attacker can still receive the testing message. rr,p is
transn~issionrange used by the last hop for the tested node.
the transmission
When adaptive
used, the probability that
adapt~vetransmission range is used.
lier can be caught is a function of r p, and e,
e, which can be
a Iier
e ) . p(rP.
e ) can be formulated as:
as:
denoted as p(r,.
p(rp.e).
p(rp,e)

l-~
2~
2.JU...

p(r p , e)
AT,.
e ) ==

1_

{ 1_

(r.e,rp+r)
271e
arcsi71(rle)
7T

e::=;
e l e],
el.
ee ::=;
5 e2,
el.

(5)
(5)

otherwise.

e1
el and e2 can be calculated in a straightforward way as
follows:
follows:
e1 =

)2r

2

-

1:2 =

r~ + 7(r 2 - r~),

(6)

Jr 2 + (r + r )2.

(7)

p

fTl,(r,).
Denote the probability density function for Tr,p as 1r,,(r
p ).
The average probability that a false position reporter can be

caught,
Pa-avg,
is:
caught: denoted as P
,-,,

Pa-aug =

1

p(T p, e)Ir" (rp)dr p.

(8)

r"

In this case f',,,(r,)
Ir" (T p) can also be assumed to be a uniformly
distributed function between 0 and T.
r. P
Pa-,,,,
a - 01 ' g then can be
calculated numerically.
In the single-path verification scheme,
scheme: the perturbation area
is the shaded area in Fig. 5,
5: which can be very large.
large.

B. Multi-Path Verification
Verificatior.1

We denote the distance between F
D as d lj ,, and the
Fl1 and D
distance between F2
F 2 and D as dd2.
2 . We assume the server selects
the third party randomly. Therefore, we can assume that ddl1 and
d 2 are randomly distributed between (0,
d2
(0: r),
r ) , and aa is randomly
distributed between (0,
(0: 'if).
n).
The distance between F
F2, which is denoted as d,
Flj and F2,
d, is
formulated as:

d = jdi

+ d~

- 2dtd2 cosa.

(lO)

It is easy to derive the formula
forn~ulafor calculating the area 5,
S:
which is:

In this subsection we analyze the verification accuracy in the
Po
multi-path P
o 22 V.
V . In particular, we calculate the probability
that a false
position
reporter can be caught and the PDF of
false
the perturbation area when tow polling messages are delivered
to test the reported position.
1)
cation with Fixed Transmitting Power: The
I) Verifi
Verification
probability that a false position reporter can be caught when
P(2,
, J ~is:
is:
,
two polling messages are sent,
sent, denoted as P

Based on Eqn. (10) and Eqn. (11),
(1 I), and distribution functions
of d jl ,, ddl:
a, the distribution of 5
S can be calculated.
2 , and ct,
2)
2 ) Verification
Verification with Adaptive Transmitting Power: The
probability that a false position reporter can be caught when
Pn2?
two polling messages are sent, denoted as P
a2 , is:

(9)

(12)

where pcth
Pcth can be obtained from Eqn.
Eqn. (3).
(3).
We now analyze the perturbation area. A typical scenario
when two testing messages are delivered to the tested node in
different paths is described in Fig. 6. The first testing message
is finally received by last hop 11 and last hop
liop 11 forwards
forwards the
message toward the tested node. Similarly,
Similarly, the second testing
message is finally received by last hop
liop 2 and last hop 2
forwards the message toward the tested node. The perturbation
area is the shaded area 5.
S.

where pa,,
Pa"g can be obtained from Eqn. (5).
When considering transmission range adaptation,
adaptation, the last
hop 11 and 2 will adjust their transmitting power based on the
positions of themselves and the position reported by the tested
node. The transmission range is the distance between the last
S
hops and the tested node. Similarly, the perturbation area 5
can be calculated in forms
forms of d jl ,, dd2>
a. and therefore the
2 , and ct,
correspondent PDF function can be obtained.

P f2 = 1- (1- pi-aug)'

!

5 =

2rarCC08(~/T) -

dJr 2

-

(~)2.

(II)

C.
Analysis Results
C. A~ial)~sis

/
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(a) Fixed transmission range

Lasll\\lr I

.- .,".

~_/",,,,
(b) Adaptive transn~ission
transmission range
Fig. 6 . The area that
tllat a tested node can receive both the
rhe testing messages.
messages

Figure 7 depicts the analysis results for the probabilities
that a node who intentionally sends a false
false position can be
caught when a single testing message is sent.
sent. We evaluate
2
using: fixed transmission ranges (F-Po
V)
both the scheme using
(F-Po2V)
2
and the scheme with ;daptive
11).
(A-Po21/).
adaptive transmission range (A-Po
In F
F-Po
transmission power values for the polling
- P o2~V,V different
,
message are used and therefore, different transmission ranges
Rtest.> are obtained. The probability
for the polling message, RteSt,,
that a node reporting a false
false position can be caught increases as
either Rt,,,
R test decreases
decreases or the position error, e, increases. In APo
P
o 22V,
V , the probability that a lier can be caught also increases
as the error increases, but it increases slowly. The reason is that
in A
A-Po
sending a false report with an error can
- P 2~V,~ aV node
,
still have the opportunity to intercept the message if it is close
to the message delivery path, and for the last forwarder (i.e.,
the last hop), other forwarders
forwarders use the maximum transmission
250m.. However,
However. the adaptive scheme can
range, which is 250m.
catch a lier with a high probability (more than 0.5)
0.5) even if
8, if two messages
the error is very small.
small. As shown in Fig. 8,
are sent on different paths, the verification
verification accuracy can be
greatly improved.
iinproved.
Figure 9 shows the perturbation
Po
perti~rbationarea in a multi-path P
o 22 VV
schemes. For each verification, two polling messages are sent.
The bold lines are the PDF values for A
A-Po
- P o 2211.
V . It is observed

~
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~est150m
.~

F-plv. ~eSl=250m

d0

60

80

100
IW

12D
120

140
Id0

lGO
11l1

180
180

200
ZM

220
220

2<10
240

Position
Posilion error (m)
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7. Probability that
hat a node sending false posi~ion
single polling message
rnessase is sent.
sent.
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false position reporter can not be caught as well as the probability of false positives. The simulation scenario is a network
1500li1 x 1500771
1500m where nodes are uniformly
unifol-mly
with an area of 1500111
distributed. Unless otherwise specified,
specified: the transmission range
for the polling message is 250m.
250m.
In Fig. 10,
10, we show the simulation results for the probability
of catching a false
false position reporter in the general case. The
Po 2 V are shown.
results for the single-path Po2\;
shown. It can be observed
transnlission range for the polling message.
that when the transmission
R te8t , is smaIL
Rt,,,,
small, there is a great probability to catch a node
who lies about its position even if this false position is very
close to where this node actually is. Similarly.
1 I shows
Similarly. Fig. II
the improved capability of catching a false position reporter
P o 2V is used. The verification results are
when multi-path Po2V
close to those in the analysis.
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that for both perturbation area and perturbation strength,
strength, AP o2V is comparable to the F-Po2V
F-Po 2V with the transmitting
Po2\/
501n. and better than the
range for polling message set as 50m,
F-Po 2 V with larger transmitting ranges. Especially, there is
F-Po2V
a high probability that the perturbation area for A-po2V
A-Po 2 V is
small.
The
perturbation
area
has
a
50%
chance
to
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50%
snlaller
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STUDY
VI. SIMULATION
SIMULATION
STUDY

To further evaluate the accuracy for the position verification
scheme,
scheme. we use simulation to collect the probabilities that a

position reporter
Fig. II.
I I . Probability of discovering a false posirion
repol.ter under multi-path
Po 2 v.
F -- I'021f.

Figure 12
12 shows the simulation results when adaptive transmission range is used for polling messages. The results are
similar to those in the analysis. A false
false reporter can be caught
with a high probability even if its real position is close to
the false
false position it claims. The multi-path scheme can further
improve the verification accuracy.
Figure 13
13 shows the probability that when the server attempts to poll a tested node for n71. times, iti t can not receive the
polling message due to the failures of routing. The probability

l
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J
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_:.----------<l----Single-patti A_ P02V

Node densiry flkm2)

14. Probability of a failure
failure for
lor the
thc tcsted node to receive the testing
Fig. 12.
12. Probability of discovering a false position reporter under .4-P
..~-P
O ~ V . Fig. 14.
o 2V.
message whcn there are malicious
~naliciousnodes in the network.
~ietwork.

can also be viewed as the probability
probability of a false positive
posItive if
a server determines a node to be malicious when the tested
node fails
fails to reply to the polling message n times. The
greedy geographic routing protocol is used for polling message
delivery. When n increases,
increases. the probability decreases.
decreases. When
n == 3,
3, this probability is small and can be ignored.
ignored. Simulation
results also show that the probability of a routing discovery
failure decreases as the node density increases. This means
that in a highly-densed network,
network, the server can decide that a
node is sending false
false positions after it fails to reply to a small
number of polling messages.

system is used, the reputation value of a legitimate position
km 2 and
service user. The network has a node density of 100/
100/k7n2
the percentage for malicious node is .5o/t"
5% The initial reputation
value is set as 1.
1. According to the results in Fig. 14,
14; the
probability of a testing message delivery failure is 0.098.5.
0.0985.
Therefore, we select CI
n value as 0.00197 and ,6 value as
001803
0.01803 so that ,3/CI
,3/a=
= (1
( 1 -- 0.098.5)/0.098.5.
0.0985)/0.0985. The simulation
results show that for relatively long period, the reputation for
a legitimate user will maintain close to the original value.
value.
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Figure 14
14 shows the probability of a false
false positive, i.e.,
i.e.? a
tested node fails to receive the polling message when there
Pmal malicious nodes in the network. We
are a percentage of p,,,,l
assume that when a malicious node is assigned to forward
the polling message, it always drops it. The curve on the
bottom is the probability of a delivery failure when there are
no malicious nodes in the network. We observe that when
the number of malicious nodes increases, the probability of
of
a failure
failure increases. We also observe that when node density
is high enough, the failure is mainly caused by intentional
dropping.
dropping. If
If there are a large number of malicious nodes in the
network, the probability of a testing message delivery failure
will be high and the position service system may not work.
Figure 15
15 shows the case when the proposed reputation
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VII. CONCLUSION
C O N C L U S I OAND
ANN D FUTURE
FUTUREWORKS
WORKS
We propose P o0 2V,
2 V , a lightweight, network layer position
verification scheme in a distributed position service system
designed for multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks. A server
verifies whether a node has sent the correct position by
sending a polling message toward the reported position using
positioning routing.
routing. The verification accuracy improves when
the transmitting power for the polling messages is reduced.
To defend against interception attack, a triangle delivery is
proposed. To mitigate the attacks on the polling message
delivery and therefore the honest nodes can be blacklisted
blacklisted to be
judged
malicious, a reputation system is used so that a node is judged
~nalicious:
not based on its single behavior, but its behavior history.
Different methods have been introduced to reduce the false
Poo 22VV is less expensive
positives caused by different reasons. P

than traditional verification schemes, easy to be implement,
and provides a verification accuracy that suffices for many
applications.
We will further study the robustness and accuracy for the
verification scheme under colluding attacks. in a scenario
where a large number of attackers are located around VHR.
We will extend the scheme by adding the functionality that the
servers within the one-hop of the tested node are used as the
last hop for verification and combine it
i t with a physical layer
approach on the last hop to improve the verification accuracy.
accuracy
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